WANGLAW Attorneys & Counselors-at-Law Charleston C. K. Wang, Esq. Immigration and Nationality Lawyers in Cincinnati, Ohio USA Charleston Wang Immigration Lawyer Cincinnati Ohio Charleston Wang Immigration Attorney Cincinnati Ohio The Wanglaw Building 6924 Plainfield Road Cincinnati, Ohio 45236 United States of America Phones: 513/793-7776 and 513/891-2888 Fax: 513/793-7779 email: charlestonwang@wanglaw.net Copyright 2007-2012 All Rights Reserved to Charleston C. K. Wang, Publisher WANGLAW is a registered tradename Caveat /Disclaimer: U.S. immigration statutes, regulations and interpretations of these and other federal, state and local law are subject to change and timely, competent counsel from a qualified legal professional on current and applicable law to particular facts is indispensable. This website provides information of a general nature and such information cannot pertain to any specific set of facts. For any particular situation, the visitor should obtain counsel from a qualified legal professional. The publisher reserves the right to amend the contents of this website at any time and for any reason |
U. S. IMMIGRATION COURT GRANTS ASYLUM TO FORMER CAPTAIN OF MONGOLIAN NATIONAL WOMEN'S BASKETBALL TEAM 06/05/2008 On June 5, 2008, the United States Immigration Court granted asylum protection under §208(a) of the Immigration & Naturalization Act to Ms. Bymbaa Ragchaa and her family because of persecution by reason of political opinion. Ms. Ragchaa began playing to play volleyball at age 10 and became seriously involved in basketball by age 15. She represented her country Mongolia in international matches, and in 1991 at age 21, she became the captain of the Women's National Team. As team captain and then later as a secretary of the Mongolian National Basketball Committee, she encountered a reluctance on the part of the government of Mongolia to fund women's basketball, preferring to give the limited money for the men. She actively spoke up for equality between men and women in the sport of basketball. For her advocacy, the government of Mongolia in 2000 under the Communist Party [officially known as the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] fired her from her job and barred her from teaching basketball. She also suffered sexual harassment and economic deprivation from the loss of the only vocation she was trained all her professional life to be good at. The women's basketball team effectively collapsed after she was fired and in 2002 the women's league for basketball was discontinued. She fled Mongolia and came to the United States in 2002 and eventually filed for asylum protection. An individual hearing was conducted on the merits by the Immigration Court in Cincinnati, Ohio on December 8, 2005 and after being continued was completed on April 21, 2008. On the basis of testimony and supporting documentary evidence the Immigration Court found that the respondent under deportation, Ms. Ragchaa "... has established that her political opinion was at least a central reason for the government's actions against her. The respondent was often told by government officials not to complain about gender inequality in Mongolian basketball. Her pursuit for equal treatment of women in the sport was supported by Democratic party members, She, along with her boss and several co-workers, all of whom were affiliated with the Democratic party, were fired from their positions in the basketball association when the Communist party gained governmental power." The Immigration Court also found that the ban against her from the sport "completely prevented the respondent from gaining employment in her field." Ms. Byambaa Ragchaa and her family were represented by Charleston C. K. Wang, Esq. before the Immigration Court. Click here for a complete copy of the Decision and Order of the Immigration Judge. |
AGGRAVATED VEHICULAR HOMICIDE IS NOT CRIME OF VIOLENCE AND IS NOT DEPORTABLE OFFENSE (2005). On December 27, 2005, the United States Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the decision of the Immigration Judge in the case of IN RE: KOEUN YOU, A27-819-377. The BIA agreed with the position taken on behalf of Mr. Kouen You that convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular assault under Ohio state law which requires a mens rea (mental state) of recklessness do not constitute crimes of violence as defined under 18 U.S. C. Section 16. The BIA dismissed the government's appeal which was based on the argument that aggravated vehicular homicide was a crime of violence. Accordingly, any permanent resident convicted under a recklessness standard (such as DUI violations) is not subject to removal or deportation from the United States. Previously on August 22, 2005, in the Matter of Koeun You, File No. A 027-819-377, an U.S. Immigration Judge of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, United States Department of Justice ruled that conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide by reason of driving while intoxicated and while attempting to use a cell phone, under Ohio Revised Code §2903.06(A) and §2903.08(a)(2) are not deportable offenses and are not crimes of violence under U.S. Immigration law. Mr. Koeun You is a permanent resident of the United States who resides in Hamilton County, Ohio. Mr. Kouen You was represented by Charleston C. K. Wang, Esq. before the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Immigration Court. To read the complete Decision by the United States Immigration Judge, click here. To read the complete Decision of the United States Board of Immigration Appeals, click here. A NOTE ON BIA DECISIONS: A precedent decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals applies to all immigration proceedings in the United States involving the same issue unless it is modified or overruled by the Attorney General, the Board, Congress, or a Federal Court. See, In re E-L-H et al. |
A CASE CONCERNING THE EMPLOYMENT OF A CHINESE CHEF 01/20/2006 An Ohio corporation, Kwan Ping, Inc. dba King Wok Chinese Restaurant petitioned to employ a specialty Chinese Chef permanently in the United States. The ETA 750 was duly approved by the U. S. Department of Labor. The Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service refused to approve the green card citing that the Petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the employee beneficiary the proffered wage. Charleston C. K. Wang, Esq. appealed to the Administrative Appeals Office in Washington, D.C. and filed a legal argument and supplemented with additional evidence. Counsel argued that the INS Director had erred and requested the reversal of the denial. On consideration of the evidence and legal brief, the Administrative Appeals Office agreed with the Petitioner and reversed the INS Director, holding that: “After a review of the federal tax returns, it is concluded that the petitioner has established that it had the ability to pay the proffered wages as of the priority date of the petition and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §1361. The petitioner has met that burden. ORDER: The appeal is sustained. The petition is granted.” Click here for a complete copy of the Decision of Robert O. Wiemann, Director of the Administrative Appeals Office of the U S Citizenship and Immigration Services, U S Department of Homeland Security. -=0=- Click here to read an OSHA case decision by the U. S. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, wherein the OSHA proposed penalty of $135,000.00 was reduced at the conclusion of trial to $11,200 and finally settled for a fraction of that amount. |
A NOTEWORTHY DECISION ON COERCIVE
POPULATION CONTROL - FORCED ABORTION &
STERLIZATION FROM THE U. S. SIXTH CIRCUIT.
In the case of Huang v. Ashcroft, No. 03-3435 (6th
Cir. 11/04/2004), the United States Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the Board of Immigration
Appeals and the Immigration Court in the coercive
family planning/forced abortion claim of Huang
Guang Hua. Huang had sought asylum under the
special provision of immigration law that protects
victims of forced abortions or sterilizations in China.
Under this provision, the BIA has determined that
the spouse of someone who has been forced to
undergo an abortion or sterilization qualifies as
having suffered past persecution on account of
political opinion. During the individual hearing
before an Immigration Judge, Huang testified that
his wife had suffered from both a forced abortion
and sterilization. He claimed Chinese officials
forced his wife to undergo an abortion in 1989. He
also claimed that after his second child was born in
1993, she was forcibly sterilized. Under §1101(a)
(42), either of these events would be grounds for
establishing past persecution.
The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Huang asylum
protection citing inconsistencies in Huang’s
testimony. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
upheld the denial. Huang appealed to the United
States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
On 11/04/2004, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit held that:
"[T]inconsistencies noted by the Immigration Judge
may cast doubt as to Huang's relationship to the
child, but not as to whether the sterilization occurred.
As to the abortion, these inconsistencies in no way
suggest that it did not occur. To the contrary, Huang
gave detailed testimony about the events leading to
and following his wife's abortion, none of which is
internally inconsistent or inconsistent with other
aspects of his depiction of events."
The Sixth Circuit concluded:
“We therefore cannot say that the inconsistencies
relied on by the IJ go to the heart of Huang's claim.
Because we believe that any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude that Huang was
credible in describing his wife's forced sterilization
and abortion, we now REVERSE the IJ and BIA's
adverse credibility determination. We accordingly
remand this case to the BIA for further
consideration.”
To read the full opinion of the U. S. Sixth Circuit,
please click here.
During the individual hearing, Huang Guang Hua
was represented by Charleston C. K. Wang, Esq.
and Mary Joan Reutter, Esq. The favorable decision
of the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
was based on the strong evidentiary record
established by trial counsel before the Immigration
Judge in 2000.
NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS |
| CHARLESTON & SHIRLEY WANG SCHOLARSHIP 2012-PRESENT The Charleston & Shirley Wang Scholarship was established to recognize the importance and achievements of the foreign-born students at Sycamore High School, City of Montgomery, Ohio. The scholarship is intended to encourage Sycamore’s foreign-born students whose first language is other than English, to continue their education and excel academically at institutions of higher learning. The scholarship also recognizes the importance of the mastery of the English language as a foundation to success in life in USA. In order to be considered for this Scholarship, the applicant must: Be a graduating senior of Sycamore High School. Have received at least ONE full year of ESL (English as a Second Language) instruction while at either Sycamore Junior High School and/or Sycamore High School. Have a minimum cumulative GPA of 3.0. If awarded the scholarship, apply the award to tuition, room and board, and/or books at a 2 or 4 year college immediately following their senior year. This Scholarship will be offered and all interested persons are encouraged to contact Sycamore High School, 7400 Cornell Road, Cincinnati OH 45242, (Phone: 513-489-0405) for further details and application form. |
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NEWSLETTER
| NON-RESIDENT ALIEN ON APPEAL WINS RIGHT TO SEEK SPOUSAL SUPPORT IN OHIO COURTS (2003). In the case of Yawei Zhao v. Qin Qian Zeng (Appeal No. C-020131 First Appellate District, Hamilton County, Ohio 2003), the Court of Appeals affirmed the right of a non-resident alien to seek spousal support via a Complaint for legal separation in the Domestic Relations Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County, Ohio. In this case, the husband, Yawei Zhao, held a F-2 temporary student visa because of his marriage to Qin Qian Zeng, a F-1 student. When his wife completed her graduate degree, obtained a job in Syracuse, New York and a new H1-B temporary work visa, she decided to file for divorce in Hamilton County, Ohio on February 9, 2001. The husband succeeded in obtaining a dismissal of this divorce action because the wife was a F-1 student and could not satisfy the domiciliary resident requirement for jurisdiction in an Ohio county court. The wife then initiated a petition for divorce via the Consulate General of the People's Republic of China located in New York City. This divorce petition was duly filed in Shanghai Zuhui District Court, China on June 5, 2001. The husband was served with the Chinese divorce petition on August 2, 2001. On August 3, 2001, the husband filed for divorce in Domestic Relations Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton Count. On Ocotober 29, 2001, the wife filed a motion to dismiss the divorce initiated by the husband. In response, the husband on November 7, 2001 amended his complaint from divorce to one for legal separation and continued his action for spousal support. After a hearing before a Hamilton County Magistrate, the trial court issued a decision that for a complaint for legal separation, jurisdiction and venue were proper in Hamilton County but the action must be dismissed because the wife had already invoked the jurisdiction of the Chinese courts by perfecting service upon the husband one day prior to his filing a complaint in Hamilton County. The Magistrate noted that both parties were Chinese nationals who were in the United States on temporary visas and that while both parties wanted to terminate their marriage, Ohio residency requirements precluded them from obtaining a divorce in Hamilton County, Ohio, but permitted the husband to proceed for legal separation. Nonetheless, the husband's effort to get spousal support was denied because jurisdictional priority was given to the Shanghai court to decide all issues related to the marriage and termination of the same. Charleston C. K. Wang, Esq. brought an appeal into the First Appellate District of Ohio on five questions of law. On June 13, 2003, the Court of Appeals after reviewing each issue of law de novo, reversed on the fifth assignment without deciding the other four, holding that Ohio's jurisdictional priority rule applies only to state courts with concurrent jurisdiction and not to foreign courts. Accordingly, the lower court erred as a matter of law when it dismissed the husband's action for spousal support by reason of a pending divorce action in China. In his appeal, the husband had also argued that the trial court violated his due-process rights, his right of access to Ohio court, and the sovereignty of the state of Ohio, issues which were not reached because of the disposition of the fifth assignment of error in his favor. In summary, this case stands for the legal proposition that a non-resident alien in Ohio may access Ohio domestic relation courts for the purpose of obtaining spousal support under an action for legal separation, notwithstanding the fact that a parallel action is pending in the courts of another country, including the country of origin. To read the complete decision, click here. |
| Charleston Wang, Esq. Attorney-at-Law |
| THE STORY OF WONG KIM ARK, A NATIVE SON WHO STRUCK A BLOW AGAINST THE CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT OF 1882. Wong Kim Ark was born in the year 1873 at No. 751 Sacramento Street, city of San Francisco, county of San Francisco, state of California, United States of America. His mother and father were persons of Chinese descent, simple subjects of the Emperor of China, were not engaged in any diplomatic or official capacity on behalf of China, but were residents of the United States. Wong Kim Ark grew up to be a laborer. In 1890, at the age of seventeen, Wong Kim Ark visited China, the distant land of his ancestors. He returned on the steamship Gaelic, and was admitted to his country of birth in the same year. After coming of age, he departed once more for China in 1894 and returned to the United States in August 1895. He sought to enter his country of birth but was refused entry by government officials. Wong Kim Ark was caught up in a time of intense public hysteria and agitation against the presence of Chinese and other Asian minorities (the “Yellow Peril”) in the American West. Local political and general public sentiment were bent on getting rid of the Chinese. The “Chinese must go” demands intensified with each cycle of economic slow-down when jobs became scarce and the Chinese were willing to work hard for less pay. In conformance with prevailing exclusionary prejudice, the local customs collector and later the local United States district attorney asserted that Wong Kim Ark was not a citizen of the United states and had no privilege to enter the country. For you see, in 1882, Congress had passed the racially discriminatory Chinese Exclusion Act which was designed to barr Chinese from coming to America. Wong Kim Ark was held in confinement as an illegal alien awaiting deportation. Wong Kim Ark protested that neither he nor his parents have ever renounced his allegiance to the United States, and that he had never done or committed any act or thing to exclude him from his country of birth. Wong Kim Ark insisted on his right to come home. He initiated a lawsuit for habeas corpus (order to release a prisoner illegally detained) in federal district court for Northern California. The court ordered Wong Kim Ark to be discharged from confinement upon finding him to be a citizen of the United States. The United States government, not satisfied with the findings of the lower court, appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, the question presented to be answered by the high Court was this: Is a child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent, who at the time of his birth are subjects of the Emperor of China, but have a permanent domicile and resident in the United States, and are carrying on business, and are not employed in the any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China, a citizen of the United States? For the Supreme Court it was a simple case. After the American Civil War (1861-1865), the Civil Rights Act of 1866 expressly provided: All persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States. The United States Congress, shortly afterwards in 1868, obviously thinking it unwise to leave so important a concept of citizenship as an ordinary law, elevated it to constitutional stature through Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Thus, the relevant part of the Constitution expressly provides: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. It is not surprising, therefore that in 1898, the Supreme Court, true to its long but checkered tradition of rendering justice independent of public hysteria, popular emotions, and political pressure, addressed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 in this manner: Whatever considerations, in the absence of a controlling provision of the Constitution, might influence the legislative or executive branch of the government to decline to admit persons of the Chinese race to the status of citizens of the United States, there are none that can constrain or permit the judiciary [i.e. the Supreme Court] to refuse to give full effect to the preemptory and explicit language of the Fourteenth Amendment, which declares and ordains that “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.” The United States government was thus ordered to release Wong Kim Ark from confinement and to admit him to his country of birth as a full fledged citizen. Having struck a legal blow against the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, a natural born, native son had finally come home. Today, most immigrants in America know that their children who are born in the United States are automatically vested with natural citizenship by virtue of the birth. Now, we should know and remember how this fundamental right was attacked, defended and won at law: Wong Kim Ark, a simple Chinese laborer, refused to accept the attempted infliction of an unjust act and chose to vigorously pursue his rights under the law. His efforts were fruitful and the fruits continue to benefit many people to this day. To read the complete Supreme Court opinion click here. If you enjoyed reading this story, click here to read the story of Yick Wo. |
NEWS NEWS NEWS NEWS |
CHARLESTON WANG, ESQUIRE WINS DUE PROCESS DECISION IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FOR HAMILTON COUNTY.
On May 2, 2012, in the case of State of Ohio v. Zou, the Ohio Court of Appeals for the 1st Appellate District of Hamilton County held that Ohio
Criminal Rule 29(A) applies to traffic violations of the Cincinnati Municipal Code because they are criminal misdemeanor offenses and "the idea
that a defendant is presumed innocent until his guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt is the very cornerstone of our criminal justice
system. It is, by design, a difficult standard to meet, and any charge to the jury which lessens the standard or which leaves the jury uncertain as
to what the standard is or how it is to be applied is not acceptable. .....If it is error for a trial court to fail to properly instruct a jury on reasonable
doubt, it is also error for a court to fail to apply the correct standard in a bench trial." To read the entire decision, click here.
On May 2, 2012, in the case of State of Ohio v. Zou, the Ohio Court of Appeals for the 1st Appellate District of Hamilton County held that Ohio
Criminal Rule 29(A) applies to traffic violations of the Cincinnati Municipal Code because they are criminal misdemeanor offenses and "the idea
that a defendant is presumed innocent until his guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt is the very cornerstone of our criminal justice
system. It is, by design, a difficult standard to meet, and any charge to the jury which lessens the standard or which leaves the jury uncertain as
to what the standard is or how it is to be applied is not acceptable. .....If it is error for a trial court to fail to properly instruct a jury on reasonable
doubt, it is also error for a court to fail to apply the correct standard in a bench trial." To read the entire decision, click here.
CHARLESTON C. K. WANG, ESQUIRE WINS AMENDED DECISION
WITH STRONG DISSENTING OPINION IN U. S. COURT OF APPEALS.
On August 11, 2010, after requesting a rehearing en banc, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued an amended opinion which
incorporated a strong dissent by Judge Boyce Martin in the case of
Japarkulova v. Holder, 615 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2010). The majority opinion
of Japarkulova written by Judge Raymond Kethledge has been cited in
more than one subsequent published cases and in counsel's briefs for the
proposition that non-precedential BIA decisions by a single member are not
entitled to Chevron expert agency deference mandated by the U.S. Supreme
Court. To read the amended decision, please click here.
WITH STRONG DISSENTING OPINION IN U. S. COURT OF APPEALS.
On August 11, 2010, after requesting a rehearing en banc, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued an amended opinion which
incorporated a strong dissent by Judge Boyce Martin in the case of
Japarkulova v. Holder, 615 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2010). The majority opinion
of Japarkulova written by Judge Raymond Kethledge has been cited in
more than one subsequent published cases and in counsel's briefs for the
proposition that non-precedential BIA decisions by a single member are not
entitled to Chevron expert agency deference mandated by the U.S. Supreme
Court. To read the amended decision, please click here.
CHARLESTON C. K. WANG, ESQUIRE OBTAINS AN AMENDED
DECISION IN THE U. S. COURT OF APPEALS.
On March 1, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit amended its decision after a petition for rehearing en banc
by Charleston C. K. Wang in the case of Abdurakhmanov v. Holder,
666 F. 3d 978 (6th Cir 2012) cert. den. 566 U.S.____ (U.S. Supr.
Ct. 2012). Both decision and amended decision are published
cases. Abdurakhmanov corrected the BIA for its mishandling of
corroborative evidence and is cited widely as authority for what
constitutes such evidence. To read the amended decision, please
click here and the decision prior to amendment, click here.
DECISION IN THE U. S. COURT OF APPEALS.
On March 1, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit amended its decision after a petition for rehearing en banc
by Charleston C. K. Wang in the case of Abdurakhmanov v. Holder,
666 F. 3d 978 (6th Cir 2012) cert. den. 566 U.S.____ (U.S. Supr.
Ct. 2012). Both decision and amended decision are published
cases. Abdurakhmanov corrected the BIA for its mishandling of
corroborative evidence and is cited widely as authority for what
constitutes such evidence. To read the amended decision, please
click here and the decision prior to amendment, click here.
A WIN IN THE U.S. SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS. On August 18, 2014 in Nifadev v. Holder, (Case No. 13-3704/4222 6th Cir.
2014), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Mikheil B. Nifadev has proven his claim that he had suffered
persecution by reason of his Russian ethnicity at the hands of the security and regular police of Uzbekistan. The Court vacated the
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Washington, D.C. which had denied Mr. Nifadev asylum, and the Court remanded the
case with additional instructions to the United States Attorney General, including that the BIA should determine whether the BIA should also
reconsider its denial of Nifadev’s application for withholding of removal and protection under Convention Against Torture (abbreviated CAT
for Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of the United Nations) in light of the
opinion of the Court. The Sixth Circuit opinion essentially and explicitly held that "[b]ecause the IJ [Immigration Judge] appears to have
erred in her determination that Nifadev did not suffer past persecution and because the IJ clearly misinterpreted Nifadev’s credible
testimony regarding the ethnic animus of the Uzbekistan security officials, we find that Nifadev has made out a credible case of being a
refugee under the definitions of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A)." [Emphasis added]. The United States Immigration Court in Cleveland, Ohio,
had initially found Mr. Nifadev and his witnesses to be credible but declined to grant asylum because it erroneously determined that Mr.
Nifadev had NOT suffered persecution. Shown in photograph on the right is Mr. Mikheil B. Nifadev with Charleston C. K. Wang, Esq. who
represented Mr. Nifadev during trial and both appeals. To read the complete opinion, please click here.
2014), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Mikheil B. Nifadev has proven his claim that he had suffered
persecution by reason of his Russian ethnicity at the hands of the security and regular police of Uzbekistan. The Court vacated the
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Washington, D.C. which had denied Mr. Nifadev asylum, and the Court remanded the
case with additional instructions to the United States Attorney General, including that the BIA should determine whether the BIA should also
reconsider its denial of Nifadev’s application for withholding of removal and protection under Convention Against Torture (abbreviated CAT
for Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of the United Nations) in light of the
opinion of the Court. The Sixth Circuit opinion essentially and explicitly held that "[b]ecause the IJ [Immigration Judge] appears to have
erred in her determination that Nifadev did not suffer past persecution and because the IJ clearly misinterpreted Nifadev’s credible
testimony regarding the ethnic animus of the Uzbekistan security officials, we find that Nifadev has made out a credible case of being a
refugee under the definitions of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A)." [Emphasis added]. The United States Immigration Court in Cleveland, Ohio,
had initially found Mr. Nifadev and his witnesses to be credible but declined to grant asylum because it erroneously determined that Mr.
Nifadev had NOT suffered persecution. Shown in photograph on the right is Mr. Mikheil B. Nifadev with Charleston C. K. Wang, Esq. who
represented Mr. Nifadev during trial and both appeals. To read the complete opinion, please click here.